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The field I am interested in exploring here we might call the sociology of morality. 
More particularly, of cosmopolitan morality. The specific question that I want to 
examine, albeit in a very preliminary way, is what is at stake in political terms in 
abandoning the claim that one’s actions are legitimized by some sort of transcendent 
authority. 
Human rights have a complicated relationship with authority.1 They are at 
their best as a critique of established forms of power and domination. Given their 
modern ascendance, and influence, their own authority is now at issue, however. In 
trying to answer this conundrum, human rights have come up against a fork in the 
road. Are they to be legitimated politically, as expressions of a partial view of how we 
might best treat each other, or are they to be grounded in morality, the practical 
realisation of a Kantian-style commitment to impartiality and disinterestedness in our 
dealings with each other. My concern here is less with the philosophical basis of this 
dilemma, as such, and more with the implications of reaching a conclusion on it for 
practical, that is politically effective, morality in the world. What is the cost of the 
retreat from transcendence in terms of effecting social change? Can one drive ethical 
transformation without claims to superior authority of some sort? Isn’t the likely 
outcome that one ends up preaching to the converted and facing resentment and 
resistance from everyone else? What does one say if one is not saying, “this is the 
right thing to do”? Does one say we would prefer things to be our way? Or, we think 
you would prefer things our way if only you understood properly that our way is 
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better for you than your way? Or even, we will make you do things our way, and soon 
you will see things our way and will have forgotten there was once another way? To 
paraphrase the Lutheran theologian Dietrich Bonhoeffer, hanged in 1945 by the SS 
for his part in the plot to assassinate Hitler, “what is morality today for a world of 
adults who no longer believe in angels?”2 
 Bonhoeffer’s presence haunted Amnesty International at its founding in 1961. 
His answer to his own question, posed about Jesus Christ rather than morality in his 
case of course, was that one needed to get involved in the stuff of life; helping in 
prisons and on the streets, bringing compassion to the poor and fighting injustice, if 
necessary through direct political action; “putting a spoke in the wheel,” as he put it. 
Amnesty has in many ways been a forty-five year conversation about this question of 
how best to respond to the uncertain authority of foundations for moral, ethical or 
religious beliefs. This was the same conversation that the more traditional Christian 
churches have also been having. The dilemma is: If no one is listening does one keep 
saying the same thing, or change the message? If one thinks that message is a truth, 
how can one change it without doing violence to one’s own moral convictions? This 
is Amnesty’s dilemma, increasingly more acute, a choice between preserving and 
nurturing its symbolic moral authority, and keeping alive the spectre of transcendent 
authority, or entering the political world of advocacy and sectarian campaigns.  
 Human rights were, from the beginning, “gravediggers” for traditional forms 
of authority, from politicians to priests, and parents to professors. The first established 
authority they challenged was the state, of course. Its gaze then moved on to other 
forms of power that were considered exclusionary and oppressive – patriarchy, 
religious intolerance, racial and sexual discrimination – then to combating the denial 
of essential needs like food, water, health, employment, even culture, and finally, as 
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their spread becomes complete, into the realm of direct person-to-person relations 
including those with children and between consenting adults. They have no use for the 
past, and are arch instruments of rationalization, described by Michael Oakeshott as 
follows: 
 
[The rationalist] stands for independence of mind on all occasions, for thought 
free from obligation to any authority save the authority of “reason”. His 
circumstances in the modern world have made him contentious: he is the 
enemy of authority, or prejudice, of the merely traditional, customary or 
habitual.3 
 
Oakeshott may have been sceptical about such rationalists in the 1960s, just as Jeremy 
Bentham thought the idea of natural rights was “nonsense on stilts” in 1789; by 2006, 
however, they are an article of faith, at least rhetorically, within the dominant 
institutions of what we might call the system of global governance: the UN and its 
agencies, the World Bank, IMF and WTO, humanitarian and development NGOs, 
structures of international jurisprudence, the corporate social responsibility programs 
of major multinationals, and more. The recent creation of a more powerful Human 
Rights Council within the UN, whose investigators can take greater initiative in 
pursuing human rights investigations against member states, is a further step in this 
direction. They are also part of the armoury of powerful, principally Western, states. 
We can see from Oakeshott’s comment, however, exactly the problem they face. How 
does reason ground its own authority if it seeks to build rather than destroy. This is 
one of the questions that concerned Leo Strauss, the intellectual conscience of 
neoconservatism in the United States. In the words of Stephen Holmes, 
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Like many others before him, Strauss believed that reason, if taken to an 
extreme, will somersault into unreason. Secular humanism – the worldview 
underlying political liberalism – brings darkness and destruction on humanity. 
By undermining religion, secular reason leads directly to personal immorality 
and political catastrophe.4  
 
Strauss’s highly elitist solution was simple – bolster and reinforce existing morality, 
most potently religion, but really whatever works, in order to avoid the breakdown of 
order among the “unphilosophical multitude” when they realize there might not be 
transcendent reasons for them to conduct themselves appropriately.5 The challenge to 
authority of human rights has thus faced resistance from conservatives in the United 
States, for example, from the 1960s onwards, as well as from critics on the old left, in 
much of the anti-Western rhetoric associated with “Asian values”, and within various 
prominent Islamic and Christian movements opposed to modernity. 
In other words, human rights may appear to be an idea whose time has come, 
representing as they do the pre-eminent ethical expression of the sense of common 
humanity that our increasingly cosmopolitan world is said to reflect. But this is 
politics at the surface. The real battle, I suggest, is the battle for authority, and that 
takes place at a deeper level, and one that human rights advocates have increasingly 
been reluctant to enter. I return to this question briefly in conclusion. 
No organization has been a more effective weapon in tearing down the various 
ideologies that sustain claims to natural authority than Amnesty International. It did 
more than any other institution to achieve universal salience for human rights. 
Founded in 1961, at the height of the Cold War, in the year the Berlin Wall was built, 
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it won the 1977 Nobel Peace Prize at a time when the UN, for example, still “treated 
human rights workers like the plague,”6 and a year before Helsinki Watch, the 
precursor to Human Rights Watch, was even founded. Amnesty has been the foremost 
champion of “principled norms”, a highly effective “moral entrepreneur.”7 By 2003, it 
had 1.7 million members in more than sixty countries. 
From 2002-2003, I did an anthropological study at Amnesty’s headquarters, its 
International Secretariat, in central London. One of the things I expected, even hoped, 
to find was an answer to some of the questions I have just been posing. From where 
did the seemingly assured and confident Amnesty staff draw their sense of the 
authority of human rights as guides to appropriate ethical behaviour? Was it faith or 
reason in action? Was this a faith that I, too, could share? Would reason lead me to it? 
Or must faith always come first? I did not, I have to say, find a reassuring certainty 
about the moral foundations of human rights, or a sort of righteous confidence in 
dismantling the natural authority claims of existing powers. What I found was almost 
entirely the opposite. In simple if emotive terms, Amnesty is as tormented by 
questions about its own authority, and by the loss of the idea of there being 
“authority” at all, as those specific authorities it has in its turn tormented. Rather than 
possessing a simple answer to questions about the grounding of human rights and why 
we should observe them, an ongoing inner struggle over fragmented authority has 
marked its entire existence. Rather than a vanguard of the future, much of what has 
gone on internally is more like nostalgia for the past. This has made it more of a sage 
rather than a herald. 
In what follows I shall attempt to explain why this is the case, and why it is so 
important that we understand Amnesty’s complicated relationship with authority. In 
section 1 I briefly describe Amnesty’s core ethos and working methods, and use the 
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French sociologist Émile Durkheim’s work on elementary forms of religious life to 
explain how I think we should understand what Amnesty is. This section draws 
heavily on the material in my book In section 2, I ask a question that fascinated me 
throughout my fieldwork and still does – why Amnesty’s practical rules for 
undertaking human rights work would come to so closely mirror Kant’s description of 
morality in his Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals of 1795. I ask the 
question: Is this reason in action? This sets the scene for the discussion of what I call 
poltical authority in section 3. Section 4 then looks at the challenge from other forms 
of authority. 
 
1. Amnesty as a Church 
There are two crucial things one discovers immediately about Amnesty’s 
institutional development. One is that human rights were not the reason for it. The 
second is that it was not a cause, single-issue or interested-driven group. It did not 
even campaign to release the two prisoners that its founder, perhaps somewhat 
inaccurately for reasons of his own, claimed were the reason for Amnesty’s founding 
in the first place.8 The importance of these facts cannot be overstated. It meant 
Amnesty was not really a human rights NGO – it was much more a movement for 
spiritual awakening. Amnesty’s founder, Peter Benenson, was on his own spiritual 
quest which for him found an outlet in the face of injustice. He drew in a wide variety 
of supporters who were also, to some degree and for various reasons, searching for 
something. Amnesty’s foundational symbol was an archetypal Christian image, that of 
the non-violent prisoner suffering on principle.9 Benenson, was a British lawyer from 
a Russian-Jewish background who had converted, just two years before he started 
Amnesty, to Roman Catholicism. Other early staff members were mainly Jewish, 
 7 
nonconformist Protestants, Quakers, or Catholics. There were relatively few 
Anglicans, the Church of England the establishment in this context. 
Adopting non-violent prisoners, so called “prisoners of conscience”, presented 
no doctrinal problems for early members. Neither did the chosen method of protest; 
sending letters to governments demanding the unconditional release of such prisoners 
of conscience or POCs. Yet, while the original Amnesty appeal of May 1961 drew 
explicit attention to 1948’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the existence of 
this customary law charter was in no meaningful sense a reason for Amnesty’s 
foundation. The language of human rights, and the intuition that lay behind them, 
fitted well with Amnesty’s demand that no one should be imprisoned for speaking 
their mind. But for Benenson, Amnesty was part of what he himself described as the 
“Christian witness.” Indeed, when he thought up the idea of the Amnesty Appeal, his 
first act was to go into St Martin-in-the-Fields Church in London and dedicate it to the 
Virgin Mary.10 In his 1983 dedication to an oral history of Amnesty, Benenson 
described this act, adding that in his view “the growth and influence of Amnesty 
International is due to the dedication, conscious or unconscious, to the benevolent 
influence of a universal, uniting, indomitable power usually referred to as 
compassion. This is the power and influence that I believe is symbolized in the 
concept of Mater Mundi.”11 Human rights were corroboration, instrumentally useful, 
and timely. But Amnesty was not founded as a human rights organization as we 
would understand that term today. 
Benenson’s initial idea was simple – to instigate a revival of faith in collective 
human action, based in individual conscience – by using the potent symbol of 
innocent suffering as a focal point to gather people together. These people would all 
be on what he described as a “wavelength”. Amnesty would, he hoped: 
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Re-kindle a fire in the minds of men. It is to give him who feels cut off 
from God a sense of belonging to something greater than himself, of being 
a small part of the entire human race.12 
 
The initial ‘Appeal for Amnesty’, published in May 1961, aimed: 
 
To find a common bond upon which the idealists of the world can co-
operate. It is designed in particular to absorb the latent enthusiasm of a 
great number of such idealists who have, since the eclipse of Socialism, 
become increasingly frustrated…those whom the Amnesty Appeal 
primarily aims to free are the men and women imprisoned by cynicism, 
and doubt.13 
 
To free people imprisoned by doubt by giving them a renewed sense of faith in 
something that transcended ordinary political action? That was Benenson’s hope. For 
him human rights, an instrumental addition to his zeal for spiritual awakening, were 
not to be part of a further erosion of authority but a restatement, and enactment, of the 
idea that there was a meaning to life that was beyond everyday, mundane existence. 
That “morality” existed somehow outside or beyond these profane moorings. That 
Amnesty was a messenger for a message, and that message was timeless and 
ahistorical. This is a position that the human rights movement has all but abandoned. 
It has become highly pragmatic, human rights now advanced on the basis of their 
functional attractions in delivering particular social goods for specific social groups. 
This movement, for political authority, has come to be increasingly influential within 
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Amnesty where it has, unsurprisingly, encountered fierce resistance from the 
proponents of what I call moral authority.  
The political context for Amnesty, a new kind of social movement, was the 
lingering aftermath of the Second World War and the intense stand off of the Cold 
War. But the deeper context was what Peter Beyer, drawing on Niklas Luhman, calls 
“globalizing modernity”, the defining feature of which was a certain scepticism about 
traditional authorities and especially growing secularism. This is the rationalism that 
so irked Oakeshott, as all conservatives from Edmund Burke onwards. Globalizing 
modernity presented the established Christian Church with a dilemma – it asked of it 
the question: What have you got to offer? Salvation? A good time? Why do we need 
you, a complete inversion of the usual ordering. As Bonhoeffer put it, everything was 
getting along without god and just as well as before. One early Amnesty member, the 
influential Bishop of Woolwich in London, John Robinson, wrote a book called 
Honest to God, in which he argued that it would be a good idea for the Church to stop 
using the word “God” for an entire generation. This sentiment was representative of 
what I call in the book “religionless Christianity.” 
What should we conclude from all of the above? That Amnesty was as much 
about authority as change. It wasn’t looking to further erode faith in transcendental 
principles but to re-establish them on firmer ground. This helped empower human 
rights as they began their political assault on indivisible sovereignty, the idea that the 
state was the sole authority when it came to the proper treatment of its citizens. 
How was Amnesty’s moral authority built? It began with these spiritual 
yearnings, but its religiosity came much more from the sense of shared purpose and 
life-saving work that grew amongst its early staff and members. It adopted human 
rights as moral scaffolding, not as foundations, but they became increasingly 
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important as Amnesty went with the flow, realizing that the language of renewed 
spirituality and a transcendent moral authority based in religion was just as much a 
victim of the globalizing modernity that human rights exemplified as the natural 
authority of the state, of parents and professors and politicians, as well as of priests. 
Amnesty pursued the release of POCs, then the cessation of torture and the 
death penalty. It pursed these causes increasingly in the language of rights. The search 
for authority therefore went hand in hand with the active promotion of human rights 
via the symbolic presence of the suffering innocent. This was a time when human 
rights were lonely voices in the wilderness, rather than the ubiquitous ethical claims 
with which we are familiar today. The very nature of the organisation Benenson 
envisaged – one in which any detainee could be a case for Amnesty, and any person 
could join – meant initial members didn’t share any substantive personal qualities, 
objective identity traits, or common interests. There couldn’t be recourse to the claim 
that Amnesty was somehow representing their interests or reflective of their identities. 
Human rights came to fill this gap. Slowly, the sense of a spiritual quest, the 
religiosity of intense collaborative work on death and suffering, and the growing 
power of human rights language, was fused in Amnesty’s working principles which 
all sought to consolidate the notion of a space that was somehow separate from 
worldly concerns. 
What gave moral authority to Amnesty’s demands was now this fusion, that is, 
its claim to be speaking not for any particular partisan point of view but for timeless 
principles; that its view was neutral and impartial, in other words. That it was, in 
Thomas Nagel’s phrase, a “view from nowhere.”14 To do this, it had to be able to 
demonstrate that it didn’t represent any interest and that its concerns were universal. It 
needed to create the idea that it was a messenger not a message, that it was simply 
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conveying what was right, and what its audience knew to be right. All trace of 
subjectivity was to be expunged. We can see this very clearly in its operating 
procedures. 
 From the start, Amnesty adopted a series of working methods that emphasized 
its role as an intermediary between morality and the people at large. These abstracted 
from any qualities it might have, making it a cipher, a kind of invisible transmission 
mechanism. The first sets of rules concerned what Amnesty would work on. It set 
itself against saying anything critical of any regime as such, racist, fascist, communist 
or capitalist. It would complain about the way individuals were treated within those 
regimes, but not about the regimes themselves which it took to be a “political” issue. 
Its principal concern was the POC, although this work later expanded to include the 
death penalty, torture, disappearances and extra-judicial executions. The most 
important fact about a POC was that he, and less frequently she, most have neither 
been violent nor advocated violence. The Christian archetype was therefore embedded 
from the first, idea of a kind of existential innocence reflecting an intuition that if 
someone had not advocated violence, then there could be no legitimate reason for 
restraining or harming them. Both of these decision – against politics, for POCs – 
came to a head almost immediately in the case of Nelson Mandela. Amnesty would 
not, at the time, criticize Apartheid, viewing it as a political question, and it could not 
adopt Mandela because of his support for violent resistance. It decided instead to 
extend its work into the areas of fair process for trials and decent prison conditions as 
a way to be able to lobby on behalf of ANC prisoners. This complex internal lore, as 
it evolved and was interpreted and reinterpreted all the time, came to be codified in a 
legendary document called the Mandate. It was the nearest thing to a stone tablet for 
Amnesty staff and members. 
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 The next set of rules concerned maintaining impartiality between the Cold war 
blocs. This entailed that groups – small collections of Amnesty members who joined 
together to raise money for POCs and their families, and to write and send letters to 
them and their governments – would receive three cases to work on, one from the 
West, one from the East, and one what we would not call the South. This structure 
quite deliberately mirrored the Holy Trinity, for Benenson. This idea of “balance” 
soon came to be reflected in every area of Amnesty’s work. Annual report entries did 
not explicitly rank a country’s human rights performance, column inches devoted to 
each country were monitored, number of cases from each country checked, as was the 
composition of Amnesty’s International Executive Committee. All were scrutinized 
so that Amnesty could continue to claim that it had no interests. Later, an even more 
elaborate rule developed. Called Work on Own Country or WOOC, it prevented 
nationals of one country from doing research or campaigning on that country. In some 
cases, it even prevented them from doing work on the country of their partner, as well. 
 These formal rules were backed by more implicit norms that eventually 
became rules for preparing reports. One was that no emotive language was to be used. 
The style of reporting would be sober, a literal retelling of a POC’s story and calls for 
his or her release. There were to be no adjectives or adverbs, nothing that would 
smack of passion or emotion. Then there was a tortuous approvals process, whereby  
any reports, press release or communiqué for public consumption was to go through 
numerous hands and be subject to minute and detailed criticism. Even as more direct 
campaigning techniques developed, like the Urgent Action Network that was 
designed to try to get a potential torture victim released immediately, the same 
approvals process had to be followed. 
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 These developments created, unsurprisingly, an intense and perfectionist 
culture amongst the small coterie of dedicated central staff. Their work became more 
like a calling. They came to codify and monitor compliance with the various methods 
and procedures necessary to maintain Amnesty’s image as an institution that 
somehow stood outside, above, and beyond politics and society and spoke simply for 
the truth. It was a spokesperson for, and a transmitter of, moral knowledge. While the 
day to day work was ostensibly about releasing prisoners and pressuring governments, 
Amnesty’s success in reality began to accumulate a sizeable store of moral authority, 
capped by the Nobel Peace Prize. In terms of Benenson’s first hope, a renewed sense 
of spirituality, it is not clear whether the disparate collection of Amnesty members 
shared anything, even core moral beliefs, beyond just being members of Amnesty. In 
terms of the second, a strong sense evolved of Amnesty’s special mission as a steward 
of the substance of moral authority, a kind of guardian of this buried treasure that the 
POC, his case publicized in the name of human rights, but not because his human 
rights were being denied, literally embodied. It is on this that I based my argument 
that we shouldn’t think of Amnesty as a human rights NGO, but more as a Church. In 
appreciating the moral power that came from a principled separation between the stuff 
of the everyday and the idea of glimpsing a transcendental truth, it unwittingly but 
effectively followed the route that Émile Durkheim argued lay at the root of all social 
life. 
 For Durkheim, religion was: 
 
A unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is 
to say, things set apart and surrounded by prohibitions – beliefs and 
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practices that unite its adherents in a single moral community called a 
church.15 
 
Integral to religion was a division between two worlds, the sacred where communal 
identity and one’s place within it was reaffirmed, and the profane, the world of day-
to-day existence. All religions must keep these worlds apart for if the profanity 
pollutes the sacred, the renewal of the society will be impossible. This line, between 
sacred and profane, is also key to the boundary between moral and political authority. 
This sense of the sacred emerged, for Durkheim, “when collective life reaches a 
certain degree of intensity it awakens religious thought”, creating a “state of 
effervescence”.16 This effervescence is based in faith, at first, but: 
 
Men cannot celebrate ceremonies for which they see no rationale, nor 
accept a faith they cannot understand. To spread it, or simply to maintain 
it, one must justify it – in other words, generate a theory of it.17 
 
Reason disciplines and rationalizes faith. This is where human rights enter the picture. 
At first simply useful supports, they now took over from un-theorized faith and 
became the reference point for why Amnesty did what it did. For Durkheim, faith was 
a “predisposition for belief which precedes proofs, [and] leads the intelligence to 
bypass the inadequacy of logical reasons,” allowing an individual to make the “leap to 
believe” that is “precisely what constitutes faith; and it is faith that gives authority to 
rites in the believer’s view.” A search for authority, in essence and in practice, a 
theorization of the faith on which that authority was originally based, the 
transformation of these intuitions about what was right and just into the more formal 
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language of rights, and eventually the emergence of such a powerful body of 
international human rights law that foundational questions no longer needed to be 
addressed – this has been Amnesty’s trajectory. There was then no nedd to go back to 
faith. These organisational realities were a strong early indication that Amnesty would 
spend as much time concerned with its inner life as it would helping to free prisoners. 
In both its critique of established political authority, i.e., the state, and its internal 
contest over who had legitimate authority, a contest that continues to this day, 
Amnesty provided and provides ample evidence of just how important the whole 
question of proper authority has been to its existence. It sought to create in practical 
terms an anchorage from which it could claim to speak for the truth. To be taken 
seriously, it needed an authority that could be cast as neutral, impartial, disinterested. 
 
2. Amnesty and Kant 
In this section, about Amnesty’s moral authority, I want to take this further by 
addressing a puzzle about moral authority. The question is, why would Amnesty’s 
working methods, and self-understanding, of which we saw something in section 1, 
have come to resemble so strongly Kant’s arguments for the foundations of morality? 
It is clear what kind of argument will be attractive for Kantians. One that says that of 
course, by right reasoning, in practical terms, about what was required to give 
Amnesty’s ethical claims their proper form, the result would be similar because that is 
what morality is, and Kant famously gave it its most succinct, if controversial, 
exposition. Is Amnesty a practical application of Kantian reasoning? Did Amnesty 
work out what Kant worked out because it reasoned as he did that morality, to be 
morality, must have certain logical characteristics. Anyone whose reasoning was right 
would reach similar conclusions. It is important to say that in Amnesty’s case that 
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there was no explicit effort at reasoning through, from a detached or impartial, even 
objective, viewpoint, what working methods ought be. They evolved through an 
intuitive understanding that “the case for Amnesty”, as one early staff member put it, 
beginning with the idea of the non-violent POC, involved a kind of detachment and 
paring away of all judgements that could be critiqued as subjective, partial, interested, 
and the like. 
But the parallels are stronger and more instructive, most notably in Amnesty’s 
understanding that what gave its cause its power was its grounding in a spirit or faith 
that transcended time and space. This was truth versus interests, and Amnesty was not 
an interest group. This is the essence of its moral authority, and it has been highly 
effective. The dominant understanding of human rights owes its symbolic power to 
this notion of moral authority. The problem, as we will see, is that it creates precisely 
the kind of assumption of natural authority that Beyer’s “globalizing modernity” – the 
rational and systematic unpicking of existing social relations – takes as its target. As 
Kant has suffered, so has Amnesty’s claim to be a moral authority, except amongst 
the declining numbers of true believers. Beyer maintained that in the world of 
globalizing modernity, institutions that claimed authority need to be able to 
demonstrate a kind of superior functional performance based on particular expertise. 
Grand claims and grand gestures no longer invite trust, and therefore willingness to be 
obligated, but simply foster suspicion. Modern citizens become sovereign consumers 
of ideas, and what to know what any given idea may have to offer them. They 
consume ethics. Amnesty established working principles that were non-contingent 
and which defied convention and fashion, but that look increasingly out of place as a 
result. 
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There are at several overlapping aspects of Kant’s argument for the logical 
foundations of morality that mirror Amnesty’s working principles: non-contingency, 
transcendence, the categorical imperative, disinterestedness, the kingdom of ends, and 
the notion of self-legislation. For Kant, these were parts of an argument about the 
necessary structure of morality. Amnesty was an enactment, faith acting through 
reason, of those principles. I’ll briefly outline Kant’s claims, link them to Amnesty’s 
institutional evolution, and finish this section by showing how this leads into a 
broader argument about the link between human rights and moral authority. Let’s 
begin with universality and transcendence.18 The truth of morality, if there is a truth to 
morality, requires that: 
 
we cannot refuse to admit that the [moral] law is of such broad significance 
that it holds not merely for men but for all rational beings as such; we must 
grant that it must be valid with absolute necessity, and not merely under 
contingent conditions and with exception. For with what right could we bring 
into unlimited respect something that might be valid only under contingent 
human conditions? And how could laws of the determination of our will be 
held to be laws of the determination of the will of any rational being whatever 
and of ourselves in so far as we are rational beings, if they were merely 
empirical and did not have their origin completely a priori in pure, but 
practical, reason (258-259). 
 
And as Kant later says of moral concepts: 
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In the purity of origin lies their worthiness to serve us as supreme practical 
principles, and to the extent that something empirical is added to them, just 
this much is subtracted from their genuine influence and from the unqualified 
worth of actions (261). 
 
This could stand as a motto for Amnesty. Purity of origin – what I have called in 
sociological terms sacredness – combined with an aversion to anything from the realm 
of the empirical that might pollute both the efficacy and the worth of Amnesty’s 
work. Morality – the ultimate secular set of demands on us to act in ways that don’t 
necessarily accord with our interests and inclinations – to be accorded the title 
“morality” must, for Kant, provide reasons that hold for everyone, equally, for all 
time. And, furthermore, the reason these reasons create obligations for us has nothing 
to do with any facet of human nature or experience or desire. We can lead a sheltered 
life, or one of unrestrained hedonism, and if we reason correctly we will come to the 
same answer as each other. 
Universal and equal application is the core of the doctrine of human rights, of 
course, and Amnesty is not unusual in being tied to it. It creates obligations that 
transcend any one person’s life situation, and emphasises human equality. What Kant 
is saying, however, is that there can be no exceptions to this, and that the reason it 
binds us is that its authority has nothing to do with how things are, have been, or 
could be in the world. Nothing we need, want, might benefit from, and so on, has any 
relevance whatsoever to whether or not a prescription for acting in a certain way is 
moral or not. One can’t draw strength from this as an interest group. Morality is the 
right answer to how we should live if only we honestly answer the question. Non-
contingency, the pursuit, if not the realisation, of coherence and logical consistency 
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became a supreme principle for Amnesty. It fought hard to avoid making exceptions, 
especially to its core principles, and it is fighting still. It sought to avoid any choices 
at all – anything that would soil the purity of the ideal with the introduction of profane 
concerns. This was a signal that Amnesty’s authority came from truth, and this 
created a reputation that bolstered the very idea that there as a truth.  
 These ideas were integral to the categorical imperative, Kant’s most famous 
moral idea. The categorical imperative commands us to act not in terms of what might 
be achieved by that action, but because it is the right thing to do whatever the result 
might be (263-264). It takes us back to the case against contingency. For a 
hypothetical imperative, if the end changes so does the obligation on us to act in a 
certain way (267). We work out what this imperative requires by following the rule: 
“Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it 
should become a universal law” (268). 
 This was reinforced by various other ideas. Take disinterestedness, for 
example. Kant is adamant that only action from duty, not through inclination or self-
interest, qualifies as moral (253). Amnesty would not meet his requirement in the 
narrow sense that not only should acts be done in accord with the law, but because of 
the law. It is hard to see how any institution that acts in the world could do so by 
taking an interest in the sense of moving from abstract to specific concerns (in 
Bernard Williams’ terms, from the third person to the first person).19 But Amnesty’s 
moral authority has depended heavily on the idea that it has no self-interest in arguing 
for a particular course of action, acting on behalf of others with whom it has no direct 
tie of interest or identity beyond membership in the ultimate abstraction, “humanity”. 
And it is clear that even though Amnesty, at foundation, was “inclined” to help, and 
that for Kant this would give such action no moral worth, a certain level of 
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deprivation and suffering amongst Amnesty staff over time has, in effect, worked 
against happiness. It is clear from a year’s exposure to the International Secretariat 
that happiness isn’t high on anyone’s list of priorities. 
Next comes the idea of the realm of ends: 
 
In the realm of ends everything has either a price or a dignity. Whatever has a 
price can be replaced by something else as its equivalent; on the other hand, 
whatever is above all price and therefore admits of no equivalent, has dignity 
(277). 
 
The realm of ends is that of morality, where each person should “treat himself and all 
others never merely as means, but in every case at the same time as an end in himself” 
(276). Reinforcing the need to act without regard to its consequences is this idea that 
people must not be used to achieve ones ends, but treated such that their well-being is 
as important a consideration as one’s own. This has, in Amnesty’s case, gone as far as 
to in some ways undermine the needs of staffers themselves. It has made it difficult, 
for example, to separate out where one’s own needs begin and where meeting 
another’s ends cease, especially when the needs of others are seemingly endless. 
Moreover, what we see in Amnesty culture over time is an antipathy not just to money 
that reflects a degree of suspicion about the motivations of those for whom money is a 
motive. Money seems to commodify suffering. This scepticism about money reflects 
a sense that the victims have no price. It often feeds into a reluctance to be 
accountable for the spending of the money on the basis that this is somehow a profane 
request. A final aspect is self-legislation, where, as an end in himself, a rational being 
is: 
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destined to be a lawgiver in the realm of ends, free from all laws of nature and 
obedient only to those laws which he himself gives (278). 
 
In a 2003 report by Amnesty on its future “image”, the following quotation bears this 
out nicely: 
 
The [basic] principles have their foundation in protecting the image and 
reputation of Amnesty International. It is AI’s image and reputation that 
have made it a potent force in support of human rights. The focus of this 
statement is on protecting that image. 
 
The values underlying the image began with: Impartiality, independence, credibility 
and consistency. The document is clear that AI “makes judgements according to its 
own values and principles”, that “AI’s decisions and actions cannot be bought,” and 
that “everything AI does can be explained by reference to its own values and 
processes.” Under credibility, the report says: 
 
What AI says can be believed because AI has said it. AI says only what it 
knows to be true, and therefore supports its decisions and actions by 
proper and adequate research.20 
 
Amnesty takes its lead from its own moral reasoning. It sought, or at least what I call 
“keepers of the flame” sought, to avoid taking anyone else’s word for it. They had to 
witness. They had to replenish their authority by being there, or at least hearing about 
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it first hand. I do not want to argue that Amnesty is explicitly Kant in action. But why 
are they so similar? Because, I suggest, both seek an anchorage that is outside the 
world of lived reality. For Kant it is reason, for Amnesty is practical reason in the 
service of faith. Moral authority cannot be moral authority unless it has a grounding 
beyond the empirical facts of everyday life. We have three main candidates for this: 
nature, god, and reason. Amnesty was a strange amalgamation of all three, attaching 
itself to the idea of natural rights, faith in transcendent meaning, and the logic of 
reasoning in terms of what would work in persuading states to release prisoners and 
members to support them. It knew its own authority was the issue, not the ends it 
sought. Faith in it, belief even, was not instrumental, not about how many POCs were 
released but about truth. The wavelength was a kind of plugging into the universe. 
This is all changing, of course. Amnesty is now asked to be more accountable 
and transparent. It is asked to provide the grounds, the “proof”, of its authority, even 
by newer staff and members, a sure sign that that authority is ebbing away. Fewer and 
fewer of its supporters will “surrender their private judgement”21 and simply trust that 
Amnesty is right, and act on that basis without undertaking their own search. Amnesty 
is being asked to show its results, to accept that human rights do not function in the 
same way for all, and that they often serve as important ways for specific identity 
groups to realize their interests. We can take the example’s of gay rights, women’s 
rights, and now abortion rights. At a book launch last week I was asked why Amnesty 
had been so slow to take up the rights of Roma, travellers in Eastern Europe. 
Amnesty’s accumulation of moral authority undermines its ability to generate political 
authority, and vice-versa. This is a fatal bind, potentially. Furthermore, its principled 
attachment to the sacred has resulted in a rejection of aspects of the profane world – 
money, family, time constraints, people’s gender and race – that need addressing if it 
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is to survive in the concrete everyday world where, in an era of challenges and 
increasing competition, it actually lives. Its new members talk of “advocacy, not 
impartiality,” and of using human rights to effect social transformations, not just 
protect certain negative freedoms from being eroded. As one experienced staffer put 
it, 
 
I can only see human rights as an overwhelming thing that invades your 
personal sphere as well as the political sphere. It’s about radical structural 
changes. In the way societies are governed…and also the way you live your 
life.22 
 
Critics of this approach accuse it of abandoning its reputation for reliability. Rather 
than holding on to its carefully nurtured moral authority, Amnesty’s internal 
contestation now includes a constituency for becoming more active in that world, by 
spending that authority. This has two dimensions, some who want Amnesty to be 
involved in more “political” campaigns, and others who want it to cash in, in more 
literal terms, on its reputation by marketing its “brand” on merchandise and other 
through other forms of endorsement. This is seen as pragmatic, useful, relevant (a 
word loathed by some of those who still jealously guard moral authority).  
 This pragmatism affects AI deeply but it is anathema to the core ethos. 
International law, the positive laws of nations, now supplants the need for 
foundational authority that is seen as conservative and cumbersome. Human rights are 
now, in effect, agreed ethical principles for regulating human conduct. The faith one 
needed is now no longer necessary – one just points to the relevant human rights 
treaty or convention. This descent from imperious oversight has greatly empowered 
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Amnesty in its ability to be more attuned to the specific complaints of certain social 
groups. The virtues of this pragmatism, the functions of human rights, and scepticism 
about the search for a grounding, are all subjects I take up in section 3. In section 4, 
we then return to Amnesty and ask what has been lost with the end of the search for 
transcendence. 
 
3. Human Rights and Authority 
Nothing could better illustrate the shift away from moral authority – or rather 
the one-shot spending of it – than Amnesty calling Guantanamo Bay the “gulag of our 
times.” It took sides against the US government, and used a deeply emotive and 
accusatory phrase to do so. Modern human rights theorists don’t see much need for 
this grounding any more. What they want to achieve can all be done through the 
authority of international law and the functional uses of human rights as political 
tools. The retreat from transcendence is seen as a boon not a cost of change in the 
human rights world. 
Peter Jones explains what is at stake, what the danger of the retreat from 
transcendence is, as follows: 
 
Rights which claim a moral foundation are subject to all of the doubts and 
difficulties that characterise any moral position. When people are in dispute 
about what is morally right, there is no straightforward equivalent to the 
statute book to which they can turn in order to resolve their differences.  
 
He goes on: 
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Human rights as moral rights cannot therefore be matters of indisputable truth; 
they must be controversial in the way that any moral position is 
controversial.23  
 
Nevertheless, the fact that there is a plurality of justifications for human rights, rather 
than a “single uncontroversial theory,” does not, in Jones’ view, undermine them. The 
variety of potential groundings for human rights he discusses are: natural law and 
natural rights, self-evidence, human worth, moral agency, contracts, self-ownership, 
goods, consequences, freedom and autonomy.24 This pluralism is a sign of strength 
for some who feel it widens the variety of arguments that can be used for why human 
rights claims are justified. Most importantly, they claim the illusion, for that’s all is 
was, is already gone. There is simply no way it could or should be rebuilt.  
 For Michael Ignatieff, the turn from moral authority to politics is to be 
welcomed. He says, in what appears to be a direct challenge to the Amnesty legacy: 
 
Human rights activism likes to portray itself an an anti-politics, in defense of 
universal moral claims designed to delegitimize “political” (i.e., ideological or 
sectarian) justifications for the abuse of human beings. In practice, impartiality 
and neutrality are just as impossible as universal and equal concern for 
everyone’s human rights. Human rights activism means taking sides, 
mobilizing constituencies powerful enough to force abusers to stop. As a 
consequence, effective human rights activism is bound to be partial and 
political.25 
 
Later on he goes further: 
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Human rights is misunderstood…if it is seen as a “secular religion.” It is not a 
creed; it is not a metaphysics. To make it so is to turn it into a species of 
idolatry: humanism worshipping itself. Elevating the moral and metaphysical 
claims made on behalf of human rights may be intended to increase its 
universal appeal. In fact, it has the opposite effect, raising doubts among 
religious and non-Western groups who do not happen to be in need of Western 
secular creeds.26 
 
This pragmatism has received its most consistent expression in the work of Richard 
Rorty for whom the necessary abandonment of what he terms “human rights 
foundationalism” would allow for the project of sentimental education.27 At the centre 
of this argument is the idea of a “human rights culture”, a liberal democratic way of 
life that he hopes can be spread through conversation, but always one that in historical 
terms may be contingent and fleeting.  
 For these authors, and many others, the burden of proof is on those who would 
keep foundationalism. Rorty believes we are reluctant to jettison it because otherwise 
all we have to go on is an appeal to the good nature of the rich and powerful and their 
propensity to be “nice” rather than to follow the moral law.28 As he says: 
 
It is revolting to think that our only hope for a decent society consists in 
softening the self-satisfied hearts of a leisure class. We want moral progress to 
burst up from below, rather than waiting patiently for condescension from the 
top. The residual popularity of Kantian ideas of “unconditional moral 
obligation” – obligation imposed by deep ahistorical noncontingent forces – 
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seems to me almost entirely due to our abhorrence for the idea that the people 
on top hold the future in their hands, that the future depends on them, that 
there is nothing more powerful to which we can appeal against them.29 
 
The refusal to let go of foundationalism is attached, for Rorty to this resentment that 
only through sentimental education, of the rich in our own societies and of non-rights 
observers in other societies, is a lingering desire for purity, for a combination of self-
mastery and self-sufficiency.30 The advent of the human rights culture obviates the 
need for this. But this sets up a more political battle between liberal norms and the 
rest, a battle that we may see the US as fighting now. 
 The loss of belief in foundationalism is not a weakness but a strength for these 
pragmatists. It makes rights more flexible, opening up a way of spreading them that 
doesn’t rely on convincing others of their truth, and on conversion, but of achieving 
behavioural change by a variety of means, sentimental education being one, self-
interest being another. Human rights ceases to be about truth, and moral obligation, 
and becomes about political and social struggle. This is often how human rights have 
actually worked, its critics outside the West arguing that in fact in their areas of the 
world Amnesty has achieved very little. In South America for example, the idea of 
rights was so successful because it was a language neither of the left nor the right, 
giving those resisting the American-backed military dictatorships of the 1970s and 
1980s a way to articulate their grievances that was at one and the same time effective 
in the West and hard to pin down as openly socialist. It improved the prospects of 
solidarity. The argument that rights were impartial thus had political efficacy in this 
case; the question of whether or not they really were impartial was to all intents and 
purposes irrelevant. 
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 In Africa, arguments for civil and political rights have been an important part 
of the demands made by opposition movements against their own dictatorships, while 
calls for social and economic rights have been potent in advocating better terms of 
trade and moral development aid from the West. Often these rights are for very 
specific things: better healthcare access, equal treatment under divorce law, or 
recognition of native ownership of land. They are characterised by an implicit appeal 
to transcendent principles combined with a demand that these rights be formalised in 
legal terms, and then monitored for compliance. 
 This raises two crucial questions with which I want to conclude this section. 
The first is the mismatch between what is implied and what is said. Does the political 
account of human rights, and their success as a means by which to achieve concrete 
social and political gains, reliant nevertheless on an implicit idea that they are in some 
more transcendent sense true? Thus, the role of Amnesty has been to establish this 
deep-seated cultural norm that what backs human rights is an insight that they are not 
contingent but real; that they are in some sense natural. I think Amnesty comes to 
look like Kant because it is trying to establish a “natural” anchorage. As Daston and 
Vidal put it, 
 
The natural is synonymous with the self-evident, melding habit with duty. The 
“is” and “ought” blur together, despite strenuous efforts to hold them apart. 
Nature’s order seems to reconcile autonomy and obedience, the strait and 
narrow path to virtue with the lazy path of least resistance. Hence the steady 
tug of nature authority, despite centuries of closely argued criticism. “Doing 
what comes naturally” holds out the dream, of the self-enforcing rule.31 
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If we all abandon the claim to something beyond the empirical “is”, if no one is doing 
the labour of building a resource that one can draw on for transcendence, then over 
time isn’t the political argument for change simply disarmed of much of its power. 
The claim to transcendent authority of some sort, nature or reason, if god is 
irreplaceable, has a simplicity, a motivating force, that can also generate collective 
action. The language of truth has to be a powerful weapon. Amnesty, through its 
imperious separation and manifest self-sacrifice, has created the impression of a truth 
that is the source of moral authority from which many, implicitly and unconsciously, 
have taken strength. 
The second is the relationship between creating the impression of access to 
truth, and the question of whether they may or may not actually be such a truth. The 
need for at least some sense that there is an answer is crucial to creating the conditions 
in which the conversation can take place, whether that conversation about how we 
might live is that of Rawls, Habermas, or Rorty. If we begin this conversation with the 
lack of anything which stands beyond rectification, in a wholly political world, then 
some of the urgency is lost and the tension between the people and the state or 
community as a collective that transcends time is gone. How will we search if we 
think there may be no destination? Doesn’t this create the kind of world Hobbes saw 
the state as the answer to? All nations do this in symbols that create the community as 
a meaningful entity beyond the life spans of any one set of particular people. They do 
it through flags, rituals and ceremonies, historical retellings and so forth. Conservative 
movements have always sought to embed these symbols of continuity, and have often 
been suspicious of rationalisation as a result. The essence of conservatism is, it is ain’t 
broke, don’t fix it. In the final section, I will say a few brief remarks about this. 
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Section 4: Amnesty and Authority 
 The most prominent conservative critique of the rights movement in the 
Western world comes from the United States. Its foreign policy variant, with which 
Max Kampelman, whose names graces this lecture, is associated of course, has in 
both the 1970s and more successfully in the early 2000s argued for a more militarised 
and muscular spreading of the doctrines of so-called “liberal” or democratic values. 
There is an irony here, of course, in that to be called a “liberal” within the United 
States is a political insult. This is for the simple reason, surely, that the liberal nature 
of the United States political and legal system is seen as such a natural fact that it is 
beyond question, meaning that the word “liberal” can be reserved for those who seem 
lax when it comes to social and moral values, something which America as a whole is 
decidedly conservative about. It is also why human rights can be an element of 
neoconservative foreign policy while the United States as a whole retains a principled 
exceptionalism to its own inclusion under this umbrella.32 It is this domestic social 
conservatism that briefly interests me here. It can be seen at its strongest in efforts to 
elect Supreme Court justices, termed “originalists”, whose  aim is to return the court 
to as literal and narrow a reading of the American Constitution as possible.33 The 
most high profile conservative to be proposed for the Supreme Court was Robert Bork 
whose nomination was defeated in a blaze of acrimony and publicity under Ronald 
Reagan. He was superseded eventually by the equally conservative if less forthright 
Justice Clarence Thomas. But the most influential of the originalists is Justice 
Antonin Scalia, for whom the proper function of a Constitution is to “rigidify things.” 
His strongest ire is reserved for the term “living Constitution,” meaning one that 
should be interpreted flexibly given changing times, and what he sees as the 
“invention” of bogus new rights like “the right to privacy.”34 The Constitution says 
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nothing about a right to abortion, and nothing to prevent states using the death 
penalty, and that for Scalia is the beginning and end of the matter. At the core of the 
conservative movement is the idea that once traditional authority has been established, 
and concrete historical individuals have found ways to get on with each other, then 
this social capital is to be protected and guarded. There is wisdom in the past, but also 
the longevity of certain institutions in maintaining social order and promoting certain 
ways of life is also testament to their value. This is all destroyed by too much 
rationalism. For the rationalists, the question is whose preferred way of life; if it is 
embedded in a social order they find unjust and oppressive, then the fact that it has 
been this way for a while or is written in a highly esteemed legal tract says nothing in 
its favour. 
For conservatives, the deployment of reason is the error here. Acquired 
historical wisdom and working mechanisms are thrown over by the rationalist – that is 
the deployer of reason – in the mistaken belief that there can be perfection and 
uniformity.35 Opponents of rationalism have other arguments too, and not all 
conservative. They can claim that human rights erode local capital, can’t substitute for 
thick social obligations, fail to generate emotional commitment or connection, and are 
far from easy to understand when one moves from intuition to enactment. This is 
where Strauss would come in, against opening up this can of worms at all. 
 Once one has authority one hangs on to it. It must be nurtured, protected, 
entrenched. Conservatives understand this. History can go backwards as well as 
forwards. It doesn’t have that Hegelian teleological drive of thesis, antithesis, 
synthesis. We are always two steps away from the precipice. The new Amnesty some, 
many, seek to make would have no sympathy with this. But the old Amnesty, 
sceptical about many if not most of the social virtues conservatives support, 
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nevertheless, understands that authority in and of itself is a valuable resource one 
meddles with at ones peril. Despite their adversarial relationship, what Amnesty 
recognised was that to generate obligation – the willingness to go against ones 
inclinations and desires, and even against ones wishes, in the service of something 
greater than oneself – one had to have a fundamental degree of trust in the authority. 
Both understand what Durkheim was talking about – that without a sense of the 
sacred, of things set apart, the renewal of society becomes impossible. Rights already 
work at a disadvantage – they need to make the case for an inclusive morality whereas 
difference can be a powerful engine for the conservatives, emphasising the attractions 
of one way of life and the need to retain its uniqueness and specificity by contrast 
with another way of life. But both are concerned with deep authority. The move into 
modern human rights – relevant, partial, campaigning – is to disavow this struggle. 
And this leaves much potential in the hands of the conservatives, who are thriving 
where the rationalists, the liberals, have created a void in terms of simple, 
comprehensible messages of meaning. What symbols do advocates of the new world 
order have to refer to in creating that sense of a natural authority that is one of the 
most important but intangible aspects of power? The power of reason, it seems to me, 
in the abstract is hopeless. But Amnesty had generated some authority in this way. 
But it couldn’t generate political allegiance. It is about non-identity and the stuff of 
social power is identity. Whatever rights say, and whatever their specific problems, 
their inability to generate authority by undertaking this new more engaged politics is a 
potentially fatal error. It will leave them, as it frequently does with liberalism, 
appealing to people’s interests, rather than a sense of something greater than 
themselves. 
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Amnesty’s founders understood that they needed more than this. To be able to 
generate belief, they needed authority. This is what the POC seemed to provide, a 
kind of moral fact. Human rights hijacked this. The secular religiosity came not from 
human rights but from the accumulation of moral authority. Amnesty looks more like 
Kant, not because it had a reasoned philosophical project, but because it sought to 
maintain foundations that were timeless and ahistorical. Authority is performed, 
through witnessing, reporting, suffering. 
Most of all, this early work created authority for Amnesty, and therefore for 
the formerly influential conception of human rights as a kind of truth, traversing the 
ages, through time and place, something that had always been true just unrealised or 
undiscovered. This was the very opposite of pragmatism. They transcended non-
contingent and logical truth. This was as powerful as authority could get, albeit in 
faith unlike Kant’s in reason.  
If we lose the sense of a possible transcendence, the conservatives are left with 
more powerful tools in their armoury. The language of nationalism is theirs. How can 
rights match this? By claiming to represent a deeper truth? Which battle are human 
rights in, for surface social change or deeper authority? Perhaps, like a pendulum the 
right is back to fighting the battle it lost in the 1960s. In the arsenal of things that you 
want to be able to say, truth is a powerful idea. Can liberals really fight the good fight 
without it? 
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